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Saher Macarius, Esq.
Law Office of Saher J. Macarius
21 Walsh St.
Framingham, MA 01701
Tel. 508-879-4443
Fax. 508-879-5444

# VERIFIED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (WITH TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER)

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Petitioner), Selim Betouche, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby petitions this Honorable Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to review his unlawful detention by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and to enjoin his removal from the United States. Petitioner also files this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to protect his rights under both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and applicable federal law. In support of this petition, Petitioner alleges as follows:

- 1998, the Immigration Judge denied this application.
- 12. Petitioner's former attorney thereafter filed an appeal of the IJ's decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but on January 21, 1999, the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal as untimely. Petitioner's former attorney did not inform Petitioner that the appeal had been dismissed or that Petitioner was subject to a final order of removal.
- 13. In April 2002, Petitioner was arrested by immigration officials based on a final order of removal.
- 14. Petitioner, through his former attorney, filed a Motion to Reopen with the Immigration Judge based on worsened country conditions in Algeria and Petitioner's fear of imminent removal to Algeria. The IJ denied the motion.
- 15. Through present counsel, Petitioner timely filed an appeal of the IJ's decision with the BIA. Petitioner's appeal alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and changed country conditions. Petitioner also filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers against former counsel. The BIA denied Petitioner's appeal on October 31, 2002.
- 16. The petitioner timely filed a Petitioner for Review in the First Circuit. On February 12, 2004, the First Circuit affirmed the BIA dismissal of Petitioner's appeal of the IJ's denial of his Motion to Reopen. The First Circuit had granted a Stay of Removal pending its decision on the petition. That stay terminated on February 12, 2004, upon the issuance of the decision of the First Circuit affirming the BIA order.
- 17. Although he has no prior criminal record and is not a danger to the community,

Petitioner has remained in government custody throughout the appeals process.

### RIGHT TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

- 18. The basis for this Court's habeas jurisdiction to review the Petitioner's claim is contained in 28 USC §2241, the general grant of habeas jurisdiction bestowed on the federal district courts, which neither the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the AEDPA), Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998) cert. den. sub nom. Reno v. Navas, March 8, 1999, nor the IIRAIRA eliminated or amended.
- 19. The Petitioner is also entitled to have his detention reviewed under the common law and as a matter of constitutional right The Writ of Habeas Corpus is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be suspended except where "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." U.S. constitution, Art. I, §9, Cl. 2(Suspension Clause).
- 20. In the present action, the petitioner asserts that his detention by the Respondent is in violation of the Constitution, the INA, and the APA.

## PETITIONER HAS NO CRIMINAL HISTORY IS NOT A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY AND IS NOT A FLIGHT RISK

- 21. This Petitioner's continued detention violates Section 241(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) "Detention, Release, and Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed".
- 22. Petitioner does not have a criminal record and is not a danger to the community. Since he was taken into custody by the BCIS, Petitioner has complied with the rules of the custodial facility and has had no disciplinary problems. Moreover,

prior to his detention, Petitioner never had any problems with the police or other law enforcement agencies in Massachusetts or any other state. He has no criminal record and no history of violence in any manner. After more than two years in custody, Petitioner appreciates the freedoms and privileges that will be afforded to him if released. He has absolutely no desire or motivation to lose those freedoms and privileges by engaging in violent conduct. He also has no prior history of violence to which he would resort.

- 23. Petitioner's continuing detention is a violation of law and fairness. Petitioner has been in custody with a final order of removal for more than two years. By law, the government must either effectuate his removal within 90 days after the date of the First Circuit decision affirming the BIA order. 8 U.S.C. 1231; §241(a)(1) Immigration and Nationality Act. The 90 day period may be extended if an alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal". Id.
- 24. The First Circuit entered a decision on February 12, 2004 affirming the order of the BIA. It has now been more than 90 days since the entry of the First Circuit's decision in this case and the government has failed to release Petitioner or to provide reasons for his not being released from custody.

### THE DISTRICT COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER PETITIONER'S RELEASE.

25. This District Court can properly exercise its authority and release Petitioner pending action on his Petition for Review. Also a district court has the inherent power to release a petitioner as ancillary relief pending habeas corpus proceedings, where the court has found both a substantial claim for relief and

extraordinary circumstances warranting release. See e.g. Mapp v. Reno, CV-99-4240 (CFS) slip op. at 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1 999)(citing cases).

Petitioner's arguments in this vein are as follows: (1) that a district court's inherent authority to release a habeas petitioner on bail does apply in the immigration context; and (2) that the district court can exercise deferential review, even though there was no final detention decision to which to defer.

With regard to the first point, this Court should not distinguish the cases as they relate to habeas proceedings brought by prisoners in the criminal context and those in the immigration context. Federal courts have recognized that federal courts possess inherent power under the common law to release petitioners on bail pending the resolution of a habeas petition. See Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d 594, 596 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1978), citing Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 53 1(3rd Cir. 1955) (explaining that federal courts do have inherent authority to release prisoners pending the resolution of a habeas petition, while noting former controversy over this issue). In <u>United States ex re. Paetau v. Watkins</u>, 164 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1947), another habeas proceeding in the immigration context, this Court necessarily rejected the distinction between habeas authority in the criminal context, and habeas authority in the civil immigration context. Citing to court rules of habeas corpus used in the criminal context, this Court found that the district court did have the authority to release an immigrant pending the appeal of a denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging an order of deportation to Germany.

The power of district courts to set bail pending resolution of habeas corpus

proceedings has been reaffirmed by federal courts in the immigration context. See e.g. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director 169 F.2d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1948) (upholding the district court's exercise of authority to release the immigrant pending the appeal of a denial of habeas corpus relief). See also Yanish v. Barber, 97 L.Ed. 1637, 73 Sup. Ct. 1105 (1953)(ordering release of immigrant on bail pending appeal of an order dismissing a petition for habeas corpus); United States ex rel. Beiftage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954)(noting that the district court released immigrant on bail pending appeal); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953)(finding under principles of habeas corpus that an immigrant was entitled to a preliminary injunction restraining the Government from revoking bail pending a proceeding to reopen an order of deportation), aff'd 346 U.S. 929 (1954); <u>Tam v. INS</u>, 14 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 1998).

#### IMMIGRATION DETENTION MUST COMPORT WITH DUE PROCESS.

26. Immigration detention involves the deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest and must be closely scrutinized to ensure that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 30 1-2 (1993) (setting forth the standard for evaluating deprivations of fundamental liberty interests and citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). Deferential review is appropriate only where an alien is challenging a discretionary denial of release by the Attorney General.

#### IMMIGRATION DETENTION IMPLICATES ALIEN'S FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST IN BEING FREE FROM PHYSICAL INCARCERATION.

27. Freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80

(1992); see also U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). This fundamental right applies to non-citizens as well whether they are in the country legally or illegally-- and is implicated by immigration detention pending deportation or removal proceedings. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991) (even undocumented aliens have substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary confinement pending deportation proceedings), cert. dismissed nom. Doherty v. Barr, 503 U.S. 901 (1992). See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)(Commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.)(emphasis added)); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 80(1992)(same); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 & n.9 (1952) (immigrants stand on equal footing with citizens under the Constitution in several respects, including the protection of personal liberty). Cf. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-749 (recognizing that in determining whether it comports with due process, a statute providing for pretrial detention must be evaluated in precisely the same manner as, inter alia, the detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings.)

# DEFERENCE IS NOT WARRANTED MERELY BECAUSE ALIENS HAVE NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO RELEASE FROM IMMIGRATION DETENTION.

28. In its opposition to requests to the federal district courts for release from custody, the Government often maintains that release from civil immigration custody pending removal has always been a privilege and a matter of grace, not a right or a constitutional entitlement. Petitioner states that the lack of an absolute right to release from immigration detention does not make the liberty interest that it implicates any less fundamental. A fundamental liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint never provides an absolute entitlement to be free. Even citizens can be detained for non-punitive purposes pursuant to Congress' legitimate and

reasonable regulatory goals, and under those circumstances have no absolute right to release. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment) (citation omitted). Similarly, Congress may authorize detention to ensure the appearance of aliens at removal proceedings and to protect the community during the removal process. However, since a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, such detention must comport with due process. Traditional due process scrutiny requires that deprivations of fundamental liberty interests must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-2 (1993) (citing, inter alia Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (1987)). The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The argument of the Respondents that resident aliens do not have the same rights as citizens of the United States may have some value only where certain categories of rights are concerned, but certainly not where substantive, or basic human rights ("We hold all men to be created equal...") are concerned. The Supreme Court recognized long ago that deportable non-citizens, even those who are unlawfully present in the United States, are protected by the Constitution. See: Sin Vip Honarey Tiv. et al. v. Janet Reno, A.G., et al., No. 99 C 0872 (Pallmeyer, J.), U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (received 02/18/99).

The Associated Press reported on May 1, 1999, that the Honorable U.S. District Court Mary Lisi (Providence, RI), after ordering the release of an alien who, as the Petitioner herein, had been held in detention by the I.N.S. According to the A.P., in The Providence Journal, Hon. Judge Lisi stated: "I find it incomprehensible that you can take a human being and keep them locked up for eternity", Lisi told a lawyer for the INS. "I cannot ascribe to that reading of the Constitution."

In <u>Hermanowski v. Farquharson</u>, et al., C.A. No. 97-220L, In the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island (decided March 1, 1999) - where a petitioner had multiple convictions (a "prolific ... criminal history"), the Court made a thorough examination of the considerations of due process, the interests of society, etc. which should be weighed against a person's constitutional rights, and it also noted that "Several federal district courts have also recently decided that indefinite detention may violate a deportable alien's due process rights." (at p. 12, , *citations omitted*). In <u>Hermanowski</u>, the Court concluded: "an alien's substantive due process rights can never be violated by detention pending deportation, ...".

The Court determined that: "Hermanowski's continued detention violates his substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary restraint on his liberty, ..."

### IRREPARABLE HARM

29. Petitioner's continuing detention is a violation of law and fairness. Petitioner has been in custody with a final order of removal for more than two years. By law, the government must either effectuate his removal within 90 days after the date of the First Circuit decision affirming the BIA order. 8 U.S.C. 1231; \$241(a)(1) Immigration and Nationality Act. The 90 day period may be extended if an alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal". Id.

- 30. It has now been more than 90 days since the entry of the First Circuit's decision in this case and the government has failed to release Petitioner or to provide reasons for his not being released from custody.
- 31. Petitioner is not a criminal. His continued detention has had significant psychological, emotional, and financial repercussions. Petitioner has limited contact with family and friends, has suffered a complete loss of income, and has been forced to coexist with hardened criminals and other nefarious persons.

### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

**WHEREFORE**, the Petitioner prays this Honorable Court to grant the following relief:

- (a) Issue a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the Respondent, ordering the release immediately of Petitioner on his own recognizance, or on a reasonable bond; or
- (b) Grant any other and further relief that this Honorable Court may deem fit and proper.

Dated: May 2, 2004

Respectfully Submitted,

Selim Betouche, by his attorney

Saher Macarius, Esq.

Law Office of Saher J. Macarius

21 Walsh St.

Framingham, MA 01701

Tel. 508-879-4443 Fax. 508-879-5444

BBO# 567460

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on May 2004, a copy of this petition was served via Certified Mail upon the following:

John ASHCROFT U.S. Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington DC 20530-0001

Michael GARCIA
Assistant Secretary for the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
c/o Office of the General Counsel
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington DC 20258

Bruce CHADBOURNE, Boston Field Director Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement c/o Office of the General Counsel U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington DC 20258

Joseph F. McDonough, Sheriff Plymouth County Correctional Facility (Jail and House of Correction) 26 Long Pond Road Plymouth, MA 02360

United States Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Office of the Chief Clerk Board of Immigration Appeals 5201 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1300 Falls Church VA 22041 United States Attorney's Office John Joseph Moakley U.S. Courthouse 1 Courthouse Way Boston MA 02210

Signed,

Saher J. Macarius, Esq.

21 Walsh Street

Framingham MA 01701

Ph. 508-879-4443

Date: 4/a/04

<b>UNITED STATES</b>	DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MA	ASSACHUSETTS

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# **CIVIL COVER SHEET**

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the Hilling and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Control of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

1. (a) PLAINTIFFS  Selim Betouche  (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Suffolk  (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				DEFENDANTS  TOPHI ASPCTOFE, 20S Attorney General  Michael Garcia, Asst. Sec. USICE  Bruce Chadbourne, Boston Field Dir. USICE  Joseph McDough, Sheriff, Plymouth Cty.  Office (INU.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)  NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.			
11. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)  □ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party)  ■ 2 U.S. Government Defendant □ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)		(For Di Citizen Citizen Citizen	TIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintif r Diversity Cases Only)    DEF				
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